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the idea of writing about his dilemma came to him in 1980, when as a senior at cornell university, he helped organize a protest at a nuclear reactor in seabrook, n.h.
the protest failed—the plant stayed open—but it caused [william] vollmann to reconsider his position on violence. "i started thinking: if this nuclear plant was as serious a risk to the environment as people claim, would violence have been worthwhile? i started wondering how you would determine that. if you could be pretty sure that this nuclear plant was going to have a meltdown at some point and kill 20,000 people, would you be justified in killing 15,000 people to prevent it? if not, why not?" ...
at the end of the book, he compiles his findings. a 78-page synopsis, dense with disclaimers, caveats, clauses and subclauses, this is mr. vollmann's moral calculus. and in instructing readers how to use it, he reveals just how unwieldy, subjective and conditional a tool it is.
"the best way to apply this calculus to a particular act is to examine the rules for every sort of justification which might possibly be applicable to it," he explains, offering this example: "what claim to righteousness might a palestinian suicide bomber possess? to evaluate that claim, one could apply the calculus to him—and to his enemies—regarding (1) the justifications concerning (a) homeland (b) creed (c) war aims (not neglecting proportionality and discrimination), (d) ground (e) honor and (f) authority; (2) the policies of (a) deterrence, (b) retaliation and (c) punishment, and (3) the fate-invocation of inevitability."
never mind that two people consulting the calculus might well arrive at different conclusions. or that it fails to deliver a definitive answer to the quandary—killing in the name of preventing nuclear holocaust—that prompted the book in the first place. users are apt to get lost just trying to navigate the thicket of categories and subcategories.
"this whole moral calculus is of course insanely impractical," mr. vollmann conceded.
nevertheless, he said, the exercise has value if it gets people to think before they act. "the more encumbered our judgment, the better," he said.
- emily eakin, "novelist's new math: a calculus of violence," new york times september 27, 2003
posted September 27, 2003 in politics, print. 2004